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The Financial Stability Oversight Council: It's Not All About the Designation
REGULATORY REFORM

By Hilary J. Allen
Hilary J. Allen is Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. She earned her LLB (JD
equivalent) from the University of Sydney, Australia, and her LLM in Securities and Financial Regulation from
Georgetown University Law Center. Prior to entering academia, she practiced at prominent law firms for seven
years (most recently at Shearman & Sterling LLP, New York), and worked with the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission, appointed by Congress to investigate the causes of the financial crisis of 2007-2008.
The recession that followed the financial crisis of 2007-2008 illustrated just how important financial stability is:
when the financial system fails, it results in credit contractions that can cause seismic problems for the economy
at large. Because financial institutions lack the incentives, information and tools to reduce the amount of risk in
the financial system as a whole, the vital task of overseeing and regulating for financial stability must necessarily
be carried out by a public body. 1
1 “Systemic risk regulation is an example where regulators cannot look to private regulatory strategies. Regulators cannot
expect that private actors will be capable of identifying how the actions of individual firms may make the financial system
less stable.” Eric J. Pan, Understanding Financial Regulation, CARDOZO WORKING PAPER No. 329, 43 (April, 2011).

The Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”) is the only regulatory body in the United States charged with
an express mandate to protect financial stability. Although the FSOC was not particularly contentious at the time
Dodd-Frank was enacted, it has since become a political hot potato, largely because of the designation power
granted to it by Section 113 of Dodd-Frank. 2 This controversy over designation powers, however, is missing
the importance of the FSOC's mission beyond its designation authority. As such, legislative attempts to revoke
the FSOC's powers – which are largely responding to concerns about the FSOC's designation powers – are
short-sighted. Reform efforts should look more holistically at the FSOC's financial stability mission, and seek to
bolster that mission by fostering the commitment of the securities and insurance regulators to financial stability
matters. In this way, non-banks can be brought within the purview of financial stability oversight without
designation, and removal of systemically important institutions from the jurisdiction of non-bank regulators
becomes less necessary.
2 This power allows the FSOC to “determine that a U.S. nonbank financial company shall be supervised by the [Federal
Reserve] and shall be subject to prudential standards … if the [FSOC] determines that material financial distress at the U.S.
nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of
the U.S. nonbank financial company, could pose a threat to the financial stability of the United States.” Effectively, this
designation power allows the FSOC to remove a non-bank financial institution from the jurisdiction of its current regulator,
and subject it to heightened prudential supervision by the Federal Reserve. Pursuant to Section 804 of Dodd-Frank, the
FSOC also has a similar power to designate systemically important financial market utilities. The mutual fund and insurance
industries in particular are concerned about the FSOC's authority to subject them to heightened, bank-like regulatory
scrutiny: the most visible manifestation of this is MetLife's current appeal of its designation as a systemically important nonbank financial company.

Legislative Reform Proposals
During the last session of Congress, Rep. Scott Garrett (R-N.J.) introduced a bill entitled the “FSOC
Transparency and Accountability Act”. 3 The bill proposed to increase the number of participants in the FSOC
itself, 4 and subject all of the FSOC's deliberations to direct observation by the House Financial Services
Committee and the Senate Banking Committee. 5 While purportedly aimed at improving transparency and
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accountability, the combined effect of these provisions would have been to increase the susceptibility of the
FSOC to political pressure, and to make the FSOC more cumbersome and thus stymie its ability to act. 6 Garre
tt's bill died with the end of the 113th Congress in January 2015, but this by no means put an end to the
controversy over the FSOC: on Jan. 7, only days after the swearing in of the new Congress, David Vitter (R-LA)
introduced S. 107, titled the “Terminating the Expansion of Too-Big-To-Fail Act of 2015”. The majority of Vitter's
bill focuses squarely on the FSOC's designation power, seeking to repeal all provisions relating to that authority.
However, several provisions of Vitter's bill reach beyond the designation process. These include: (i) the repeal
of Section 120(d)(3) of Dodd-Frank, which directs the FSOC to consider legislation regulating non-bank financial
institutions that have no primary federal regulator, but pose risks to financial stability; (ii) the repeal of Sections
216 and 217 of Dodd-Frank, which require studies relating to domestic and international procedures for the
resolution of non-bank financial institutions; and (iii) the repeal of the entire Title VIII of Dodd-Frank, which
relates to regulation of payment, clearing and settlement systems (sometimes referred to as the “plumbing” of
the financial system). These latter reforms go beyond the designation issue, and if enacted, would prevent the
FSOC from looking at systemic risks building up in some of the non-bank corners of the financial system.
3 H.R. 4387 (2014).
4 Section 2(b) of the bill would have made every member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the SEC, the CFTC,
the FDIC and the NCUA a member of the FSOC – bringing twenty more people to the table at any FSOC meeting on
financial stability matters (but still giving each agency only one vote, requiring each multi-party commission to agree to take
action before the FSOC as a whole could do so).
5 Section 2(c) of the bill would require that “at any FSOC meeting… Even if the meeting was being held in private, it could
be attended by up to 83 legislators — the 61 members of the House Financial Services Committee and the 22 members of
the Senate Banking Committee. If staff members from the FSOC member agencies assembled for a meeting, the Financial
Services and Banking Committee staffs would also have to be invited.” Floyd Norris, Financial Crisis, Over and Already
Forgotten, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2014).
6 Lubben has noted that the bill “purports to be aimed at increasing transparency at the council. But its real aim is clearly to
muck up the workings of the council.” Stephen J. Lubben, A Legislative Assault on the Financial Stability Oversight Council,
N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2014).

The FSOC's Non-Designation Functions
There is thus a danger that, in seeking to constrain the FSOC's designation powers, lawmakers may
(intentionally or unintentionally) also hamper the FSOC's ability to perform its other functions. Although these
other functions have received little attention, they are vital to the preservation of financial stability, in the United
States and globally. The FSOC serves as a forum for communication and coordination regarding risks to the
financial system: in the United States, regulatory responsibility for different types of financial services and
institutions is allocated to different regulatory agencies, 7 and it became abundantly clear during the financial
crisis of 2007-2008 that not one of these agencies saw “its job as protecting the economy and financial system
as a whole.” 8 The FSOC was formed by Dodd-Frank as one response to this problem. 9 Section 111(e) of
Dodd-Frank requires the FSOC to meet at least quarterly, Section 112(a)(2)(N) requires the FSOC to publish an
annual report which identifies potential threats to financial stability, and Section 112(c) requires the Secretary of
the Treasury (who serves as the Chairperson of the FSOC) to testify before Congress at least annually
regarding financial stability matters.
7 The voting members of the FSOC are the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Chairperson of the FDIC, the Director of the CFPB, the Chairman of the SEC, the
Chairperson of the CFTC, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency and the Chairman of the National Credit
Union Administration Board, as well as “an independent member appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, having insurance expertise.” The FSOC also has five non-voting members: the Director of the Office
of Financial Research, the Director of the Federal Insurance Office, and representative state banking, insurance and
securities commissioners. Dodd-Frank Section 111(b).
8 Department of Treasury, Financial Regulator Reform: A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision and
Regulation, 2 (Jun. 2009).
9 “The broad membership of the council is intended to limit the tendency of regulators to focus narrowly on the institutions
and markets within their jurisdictions while overlooking risks from interdependencies that cut across jurisdictions.” Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Speech at 47th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition,
Chicago, Illinois (May 5, 2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke201105
05a.htm.

Furthermore, the statutory requirement in Section 112(b) of
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There is thus a danger that, in seeking

Dodd-Frank that each voting member of the FSOC submit an
annual statement to Congress regarding extant threats to
financial stability gives each such member (and their agency)
powers, lawmakers may (intentionally
an implicit direction to monitor and confer regarding such
or unintentionally) also hamper the
threats. Similarly, section 120, which authorizes the FSOC to
make recommendations that a financial regulatory agency
FSOC's ability to perform its other
“apply new or heightened standards and safeguards … for a
functions.
financial activity or practice” if the FSOC determines that such
activity or practice is systemically risky, implicitly directs the
FSOC members to monitor potentially problematic financial activities or practices – no matter where in the
financial system they are occurring.

to constrain the FSOC's designation

The FSOC therefore performs a number of important functions as a financial stability regulator, beyond its role
as a designator pursuant to Section 113. That is not to say that the FSOC is a perfectly designed financial
stability regulator – indeed, the FSOC's structure and mandate leave much to be desired. Importantly, the FSOC
has only a small staff and limited funding, and is designed to work by “leverag[ing] the expertise that already
exists at each [financial regulatory] agency”. 10 If the financial regulatory agencies led by the FSOC's members
are not committed to financial stability, then the FSOC's efficacy will be limited. While the Federal Reserve has
actively pursued financial stability issues since the financial crisis, it has no express statutory mandate to that
end, and its enthusiasm for its self-described “implied financial stability mandate” 11 may wane over time (when
the financial system appears to be performing well, the public and politicians provide little public support to
regulators who face consistent pressure from the financial industry to repeal and under-enforce financial stability
regulations). 12 Furthermore, to the extent that the Federal Reserve's bank-informed perspective dominates on
financial stability issues, there is a concern that other regulators' understanding of different institutions and
markets, and how they generate, transmit, and cope with risks, will not be heard within the FSOC. These other
perspectives are integral to financial stability regulation, because although financial instability can certainly arise
because of the failure of a bank (or a large non-bank), financial instability can also arise because of the failure of
a number of smaller, non-bank institutions with correlated exposures (or even in the absence of institutional
failure, if a problem with a widespread asset class damages confidence in a market). 13
10 FSOC, About FSOC: Frequently Asked Questions (available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pa
ges/default.aspx).
11 “The Federal Reserve's financial stability mandate is seen in the penumbra of the Federal Reserve Act, and that is
legally sufficient … leading economic thinkers would now say, and the financial crisis seems to offer us the perfect
illustration, that price stability and maximum employment are possible only in a context of financial stability.” Thomas C.
Baxter Jr., Executive Vice President and General Council of the Federal Reserve, Remarks at the Future of Banking
Regulation and Supervision in the EU Conference, Frankfurt, Germany (Nov. 15, 2013) (available at http://www.newyorkf
ed.org/newsevents/speeches/2013/bax131120.html).
12 Iman Anabtawi and Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure,
92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 96-98 (2013). Coffee notes that there is no natural constituency for financial stability regulation
that can counterbalance the political power of financial institutions. John C. Coffee Jr., The Political Economy of DoddFrank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019,
1031 (2012).
13 “We should note, the weakest link in the financial stability chain might be small, rather than large, financial
intermediaries.” Eric S. Rosengren, President & CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Defining Financial Stability,
and Some Policy Implications of Applying the Definition, Keynote Remarks at the Stanford Finance Form, Graduate School
of Business, Stanford University, 4, 9 (Jun. 3, 2011).

It is also less than ideal that the Treasury Secretary, who is a Presidential cabinet appointee and thus less
insulated from politics than any of the other members of the FSOC, is the Chairperson with the power to call
meetings and set the agenda of the FSOC. 14 The structure of the FSOC as financial stability regulator is thus
suboptimal, and there are also problems with the FSOC's mandate that are addressed more fully in this article's
discussion of potential reforms. Despite its shortcomings, however, the FSOC remains the only United States
agency that is wholly and expressly dedicated to financial stability. Reformers should thus focus on bolstering
the FSOC's mandate and increasing the participation of securities and insurance regulators, rather than
focusing myopically on the FSOC's designation powers and seeking to neuter the FSOC for that reason.
14 David Skeel, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED)
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CONSEQUENCES, 12 (2011): “Because the Treasury secretary is directly responsible to the President, he is the least
independent, and the most political, of the financial regulators. Yet the Treasury secretary is given leadership responsibility
on the new Financial Stability Oversight Council and in other areas.”

The most effective [structural reform]

Potential Reforms

There are a number of structural reforms that would vastly
improve the quality of financial stability regulation in the United
model whereby the FSOC, OCC,
States. The most effective of these would be to move to a “twin
FDIC, SEC, CFTC and NCUA would all
peaks” model whereby the FSOC, OCC, FDIC, SEC, CFTC
and NCUA would all be abolished, and in their place would be
be abolished, and in their place would
created two new agencies — a market conduct regulator and a
be created two new agencies — a
stand-alone prudential regulator. The prudential regulator would
market conduct regulator and a standbe mandated to pursue financial stability, and the creation of
such an agency would likely improve regulatory commitment to,
alone prudential regulator.
and understanding of, financial stability issues (as well as
minimize capture, and limit the potential for regulatory
arbitrage). The creation of such a prudential regulator would also temper the controversy over designation
powers, because such regulator would already have jurisdiction over all entities that carry out financial activities,
no matter what their legal form. However, recognizing the resistance of the United States financial regulatory
architecture to wholesale change, the remainder of this article will outline some smaller-scale changes designed
to incrementally improve financial stability regulation. The amendments to Dodd-Frank proposed here are
qualitatively different to the reforms that have been proposed by Garrett and Vitter. Instead of attempting to
stymie the FSOC's ability to act, these reforms focus squarely on improving the commitment of the FSOC and
its members to financial stability. The more committed that the non-bank financial regulators (for example, the
SEC) are to financial stability matters, the less need there will be for the FSOC to use its Section 113
designation powers to remove institutions (for example, mutual funds) from the jurisdiction of their current
regulator to the jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve.

would be to move to a “twin peaks”

• Repeal Section 112(a)(1)(B) of Dodd-Frank
The FSOC's mandate is set out in Section 112(a)(1) of Dodd-Frank, and reads as follows:
The purposes of the Council are—
(A) to identify risks to the financial stability of the United States that could arise from the material financial
distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of large, inter- connected bank holding companies or nonbank financial
companies, or that could arise outside the financial services marketplace;
(B) to promote market discipline, by eliminating expectations on the part of shareholders, creditors, and
counterparties of such companies that the Government will shield them from losses in the event of failure; and
(C) to respond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial system.
Subsection (B) of this mandate is at cross-purposes with the
rest of the mandate, and should be repealed. Although DoddFrank purports to end bailouts, the general consensus is that
be amended to include a definition of
government intervention will still be required, and provided, in
“financial stability”.
the event of a sufficiently large future crisis. 15 While it is
preferable to proactively address potential financial stability
concerns, emergency measures may nonetheless be required, and so well-designed ex post safety nets should
be formalized in advance to allow the FSOC to carry out its mandated purpose in Section 112(a)(1)(C): to
“[r]espond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial system”.

Most importantly, Dodd-Frank should

• Amend Sections 112(a)(2)(N) and 112(b) of Dodd-Frank
15 See, for example, Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L. J. 435, 513 (2011); Cheryl D. Block, Measuring
the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH U. L. REV. 149, 224 (2010); Simon Johnson & James Kwak, 13
BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010), 207.

To help focus the financial regulatory agencies led by the FSOC's members on financial stability matters, the
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testimony and written certifications required pursuant to Sections 112(a)(2)(N) and 112(b) of Dodd-Frank should
be revised.
Section 112(a)(2)(N) of Dodd-Frank requires the Treasury Secretary, on behalf of the FSOC, to testify before
Congress each year regarding “potential emerging threats to the financial stability of the United States.” This
requirement should be expanded so that all of the FSOC's voting members are required to appear together
before Congress at this annual hearing, and field questions regarding financial stability. In doing so, the FSOC's
voting members would not only maintain the salience of financial stability issues for themselves, they would also
play an educative role, informing the legislature and the public at large about risks arising in the non-bank
corners of the financial system.
Section 112(b) currently requires the FSOC's voting members to submit signed statements certifying their belief
that the FSOC, the Government and the private sector “are taking all reasonable steps to ensure financial
stability and to mitigate systemic risk that would negatively affect the economy.” At present, this certification
does not require a voting member to certify that their agency, independently, is taking steps to promote financial
stability. The law should be changed to require each voting member of the FSOC to sign a statement that they
are also satisfied with their own agency's efforts to promote financial stability, so that the voting member is
required to take, at least symbolically, personal responsibility for their agency's commitment to financial stability
matters.
• Include a definition of “financial stability” in Dodd-Frank
Most importantly, Dodd-Frank should be amended to include a definition of “financial stability”. Despite the
ubiquity of the term in Dodd-Frank (including in the FSOC's mandate), it is never actually defined in the
legislation. This is problematic for a number of reasons: at the most basic level, the absence of any such
definition may result in different regulators seeking to achieve divergent goals, all in the name of “financial
stability”. More fundamentally, the absence of a robustly defined financial stability mandate saps the legitimacy
of regulators' attempts to preserve financial stability, and makes regulators more susceptible to capture and
lobbying. A well-defined mandate is more likely to focus regulatory attention on financial stability issues in
normal and boom times, when financial stability regulation remains vitally important, but lacks support from a
public that is largely oblivious to such issues.
I have previously argued that the concept of financial stability should be defined to include both technical and
policy-driven components. In terms of what is meant technically by “financial stability”, the term should mean
both the absence of financial crisis and the financial system's ability to absorb (rather than amplify) shocks. We
should not be satisfied simply because we are not currently facing a crisis, if conditions exist that make future
crises likely. In terms of why financial stability should be a policy goal in the first place, the focus needs to be on
the externalities that financial system failure generates for the broader economy, rather than on the financial
system as an end in itself. If financial institutions and markets could fail without harming the broader economy,
then financial stability would not be an important public policy goal.
Accordingly, I have proposed that the following definition of “financial stability” should be included in DoddFrank.
The term “financial stability” shall mean a state of affairs wherein (i) financial institutions and markets are able to
facilitate capital intermediation, risk management, and payment services in a way that enables sustainable
economic growth; (ii) there is no disruption to the ability of financial institutions or markets to carry out such
functions that might cause harm to persons (wherever they may be resident) who are not customers or
counterparties of those financial institutions, nor participants in those financial markets; and (iii) financial
institutions and markets are able to withstand economic shocks (such as the failure of other markets and
institutions, or a chain of significant losses at financial institutions) so that (x) there will be no disruption to the
performance of the functions set forth in (i) and (y) no harm will be caused to the persons set forth in (ii). 16
16 Hilary J. Allen, What is “Financial Stability”? The Need for Some Common Language in International Financial
Regulation, 45 GEO. J. INT'L L. 929, 932 (2014).

To sum up, the reforms proposed in this Article will not guarantee perfect financial stability regulation. However,
unlike the reforms proposed by Garrett and Vitter which try to defuse the designation issue by more generally
circumscribing the FSOC's powers, this Article's reforms will make designation a less important issue by
fostering the commitment of the non-banking members of the FSOC to monitoring and addressing the financial
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stability issues arising in their own spheres of influence.
A draft of Professor Allen's full article “Putting the “Financial Stability” in Financial Stability Oversight Council”
can be accessed at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2485949.
Journal
CONFERENCES
Upcoming meetings, conferences, teleconferences, webinars and other events of interest to Banking Report
subscribers.
March 2015
OCC Community Bank Directors Workshop (Risk Governance): March 10; Morristown, N.J.;
occ@seiservices.com; (240) 485-1700;http://www.seiservices.com/occ2015/default.aspx.
CBA Live: March 23-25; Orlando; tmorgan@cbanet.org; http://www.cbanet.org/Education%20and%20Events/Ev
ent_CBA_LIVE.aspx.
ABA Government Relations Summit: March 23-25; Washington, D.C.; sbonney@aba.com; http://www.aba.com/
Training/Conferences/Pages/GRS.aspx.
April 2015
OCC Community Bank Directors Workshop (Compliance Risk): April 21; Denver; https://www.seiservices.com/o
cc2015/.
June 2015
ABA Regulatory Compliance Conference: June 14-17; Washington, D.C.; dfriedla@aba.com; http://www.aba.co
m/Training/Conferences/Pages/RCC.aspx.

© 2020 The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Services

// PAGE 87

